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Conceptual Foundations 
Walton and McKersie's Subprocesses 
of Negotiations 
THOMAS A. KOCHAN 
DAVID B. LIPSKY 
Walton and McKersie's 1965 book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Nego-
tiations, provides much of the conceptual underpinnings of what grew 
into the modern-day teaching of negotiations in business, public policy, 
law, and other professional schools. We therefore believe that it is useful 
to outline the basic concepts and ideas introduced by these authors. We do 
so, however, with a word of caution. There is no substitute for the origi-
nal. Every student should have the pleasure of struggling (as we did the 
first time it was assigned to us as students) with the tongue twisters like 
"attitudinal structuring" and the many other new terms and theoretical 
ideas introduced in the book! 
The Four Subprocesses of Negotiations 
The heart of the Walton and McKersie model are four subprocesses that 
together make up the negotiation process. The authors draw on a wide 
range of literature and theories from economics, psychology, group dy-
namics, and industrial relations to develop these subprocesses. 
Distributive Bargaining 
The distributive bargaining subprocess refers to how negotiators resolve 
differences when their interests or positions are in conflict. In game theory 
this is referred to as a zero-sum game; behavioral scientists sometimes call 
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this a win-lose process. Negotiators are assumed to start bargaining with a 
gap between their positions. The bargaining task is to locate a compro-
mise on a continuum somewhere in between. Bargainers are further as-
sumed to have some target point and some resistance point in mind that 
influence their offers and counteroffers. The target point reflects the aspi-
rations or most-favorable goals each party has for the outcome, while the 
resistance point captures the least-favorable outcome acceptable to each 
party. If there is a gap between resistance points, as in Figure 1.1a, there is 
said to be a negative contract zone, and an impasse (perhaps a strike in 
labor negotiations) is likely. 
A positive contract zone (Figure 1.1b) indicates an overlap in bottom-
line positions: potential for an agreement exists. What keeps the parties 
motivated to negotiate when their interests are in conflict? They are as-
sumed to be tied together in an ongoing interdependent relationship. Each 
party needs the other to satisfy its interests. The employer needs the work-
ers and is in an ongoing bargaining relationship with the union. The work-
ers need the employer for their livelihood. So, in this model the alternative 
to an agreement is a temporary impasse or strike, not a permanent ending 
of the relationship as might be the case if a buyer and seller of a used car 
cannot agree on an acceptable price. 
Walton and McKersie go on to use a variety of behavioral science con-
cepts to illuminate how negotiators think about their interdependence, 
how they make decisions, how the concession-making process unfolds, 
and how parties use commitment tactics to enhance their individual gains. 
While for some, distributive bargaining is the full story of negotiations, it 
is only the starting point in the Walton and McKersie model. 
Integrative Bargaining 
Integrative bargaining refers to the process of seeking joint gains by ei-
ther approaching or expanding the Pareto-optimal frontier. The parties 
see themselves as having a joint problem. Walton and McKersie present a 
problem-solving model to explain the dynamics of reaching an agreement. 
Integrative bargaining can take place over a single issue in which the. par-
ties identify a common objective or over multiple issues, some of which in-
volve conflicting interests and some, shared interests. They refer to the lat-
ter situation as a mixed-motive situation and see this as the most common 
type of negotiation. When facing a mixed-motive negotiation, the task is 
to look for trade-offs across the issues that leave both parties better off 
than if they dealt with each separately. Later, other behavioral scientists 
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would use the term win-win bargaining to describe integrative bargaining. 
Some would equate integrative or win-win bargaining with Fisher and 
Ury's concept of interest-based or principled negotiations, although Fisher 
and Ury distinguish their concept from both distributive and integrative 
bargaining (Fisher and Ury 1981). 
Intra-organizational Bargaining 
A third subprocess, intra-organizational bargaining, recognizes that ne-
gotiators often do not act as individual decision makers. Instead, they 
serve as representatives of groups or organizations and must answer to 
these constituents. This feature gives rise to the possibility, indeed the like-
lihood, that there are diverse views or interests within these organizations. 
Thus, negotiation needs to take place within each group to reconcile 
differences and unite negotiating efforts. Each party therefore has to en-
gage in several levels of intra-organizational bargaining—negotiating 
within the team and with the constituency—in order to build consensus 
within the party. 
Attitudinal Structuring 
Finally, Walton and McKersie realized that it makes a difference how 
the parties view each other in the bargaining process. The fourth sub-
process, attitudinal structuring, specifically addresses these perceptions 
and proposes ways that negotiators can shape the other party's attitudes to 
advance either their own or their mutual advantage. It makes explicit that 
negotiations involve more than the substantive terms of the deal. Negotia-
tions also produce relationship outcomes. Parties may increase or decrease 
their trust in each other as a result of how they are treated by the other 
party in negotiations. In turn, these perceptions will shape the context for 
future interactions or rounds of negotiation the parties have with each 
other. An important part of negotiation, therefore, involves a judgment of 
how hard to push one's temporary bargaining advantage or power if doing 
so might produce a negative reaction from a party to an ongoing relation-
ship like a marriage, a work group, a strategic business partnership, or a 
labor-management relationship. 
While these subprocesses are introduced separately, much of the art and 
science of negotiations lies in how they interact. Low trust inhibits inte-
grative bargaining. Failure to resolve intra-organizational conflicts prior 
to bargaining slows the concession and compromise processes in distribu-
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tive bargaining. Negotiators who engage in integrative bargaining when 
constituents have low trust in them or their bargaining counterparts risk 
rejection of tentative agreements. Poor communications, perhaps because 
of low trust, may lead to impasses even when a positive contract zone ex-
ists. All the dynamics and the ultimate outcome of negotiations are influ-
enced by the relative power of the parties. 
This brief summary only introduces the broad features and central con-
cepts in the Walton and McKersie model. We leave it to the authors of the 
other chapters in this volume to illustrate the many ways this theory has 
shaped the research, teaching, and practice of negotiations in the years 
since its publication. 
